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Abstract. In the problem of reliable multiparty computation (RC), there are n parties, each
with an individual input, and the parties want to jointly compute a function f over n inputs.
The problem is complicated by the fact that an omniscient adversary controls a hidden fraction
of the parties.
We describe a self-healing algorithm for this problem. In particular, for a fixed function f ,
with n parties and m gates, we describe how to perform RC repeatedly as the inputs to f
change. Our algorithm maintains the following properties, even when an adversary controls
up to t ≤ ( 1
4
− )n parties, for any constant  > 0. First, our algorithm performs each re-
liable computation with the following amortized resource costs: O(m + n logn) messages,
O(m + n logn) computational operations, and O(`) latency, where ` is the depth of the cir-
cuit that computes f . Second, the expected total number of corruptions is O(t(log∗m)2), after
which the adversarially controlled parties are effectively quarantined so that they cause no more
corruptions.
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1 Introduction
How can we protect a network against adversarial attack? A traditional approach provides robustness
through redundant components. If one component is attacked, the remaining components maintain
functionality. Unfortunately, this approach incurs significant resource cost, even when the network
is not under attack.
An alternative approach is self-healing, where a network automatically recovers from attacks.
Self-healing algorithms expend additional resources only when it is necessary to repair from attacks.
In this paper, we describe self-healing algorithms for the problem of reliable multiparty compu-
tation (RC). In the RC problem, there are n parties, each with an individual input, and the parties
want to jointly compute a function f over n inputs. A hidden 1/4-fraction of the parties are con-
trolled by an omniscient Byzantine adversary. A party that is controlled by the adversary is said to
be bad, and the remaining parties are said to be good. Our goal is to ensure that all good parties learn
the output of f . 1
RC abstracts many problems that may occur in high-performance computing, sensor networks,
and peer-to-peer networks. For example, we can use RC to enable performance profiling and system
monitoring, compute order statistics, and enable public voting.
Our main result is an algorithm for RC that 1) is asymptotically optimal in terms of total mes-
sages and total computational operations; and 2) limits the expected total number of corruptions.
Ideally, each bad party would cause O(1) corruptions; in our algorithm, each bad party causes an
expected O((log∗m)2) corruptions.
? This research is partially supported by NSF Award SATC 1318880.
1 Note that RC differs from secure multiparty computation (MPC) only in that there is no requirement to keep
inputs private.
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21.1 Our Model
We assume a static Byzantine adversary that takes over t ≤ ( 14 − )n parties before the algorithm
begins, for any constant  > 0. As mentioned previously, parties that are compromised by the
adversary are called bad, and the remaining parties are good. The bad parties may arbitrarily deviate
from the protocol, by sending no messages, excessive numbers of messages, incorrect messages,
or any combination of these. The good parties follow the protocol. We assume that the adversary
knows our protocol, but is unaware of the random bits of the good nodes. We make use of a public
key cryptography scheme, and thus assume that the adversary is computationally bounded.
We assume a partially synchronous communication model. Any message sent from one good
node to another good node requires at most h time steps to be sent and received, and the value h
is known to all nodes. However, we allow the adversary to be rushing: the bad nodes receive all
messages from good nodes in a round before sending out their own messages. We further assume
that each party has a unique ID. We say that party p has a link to party q if p knows q’s ID and can
thus directly communicate with node q.
In the reliable multiparty computation problem, we assume that the function f can be imple-
mented with an arithmetic circuit over m gates, where each gate has two inputs and at most two
outputs.2 For simplicity of presentation, we focus on computing a single function multiple times
(with changing inputs). However, we can also compute multiple functions with our algorithm.
1.2 Our Result
We describe an algorithm, COMPUTE, to efficiently solve reliable multiparty computation. Our
main result is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Assume we have n parties providing inputs to a function f that can be computed by
an arithmetic circuit with depth ` and containing m gates. Then COMPUTE solves RC and has the
following properties.
– In an amortized sense,3 any execution of COMPUTE requires the following expected costs:
• O(m+ n log n) messages sent by all parties,
• O(m+ n log n) computational operations performed by all parties, and
• O(`) latency.
– The expected total number of times COMPUTE returns a corrupted output is O(t(log∗m)2).
1.3 Technical Overview
Our algorithms make critical use of quorums and a quorum graph.
Quorums and the Quorum Graph: We define a quorum to be a set of Θ(log n) parties, of which
at most 1/4-fraction are bad. Many results show how to create and maintain a network of quo-
rums [6,11,18,23,7,1,14]. All of these results maintain what we will call a quorum graph in which
each vertex represents a quorum. The properties of the quorum graph are: 1) each party is inΘ(log n)
quorums; 2) for any quorum Q, any party in Q can communicate directly to any other party in Q;
and 3) for any quorums Q and Q′ that are connected in the quorum graph, any party in Q can com-
municate directly with any party in Q′ and vice versa. Moreover, we assume that for any two parties
x and y in a quorum, x knows all quorums that y is in.
2 We note that any gate of any fixed in-degree and out-degree can be converted into a fixed number of gates
with in-degree 2 and out-degree at most 2.
3 In particular, if we call COMPUTE L times, then the expected total number of messages sent will be
O(L(m + n logn) + t(m log2 n)). Since t is fixed, for large L, the expected number of messages per
COMPUTE is O(m+ n logn). The result for computational operations is similar.
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Fig. 1. Quorum-Based Circuit
Computing with Quorums: We maintain a quorum graph with m+n nodes: m nodes for the gates
of the circuit and n nodes for the inputs of the parties. The input nodes are connected to the gates
using these inputs, and the gate nodes are connected as in the circuit. Quorums are mapped to nodes
in this quorum graph as described above. See Figure 1. Intuitively, the computation is performed
from the left to the right, where the input quorums are the leftmost quorums and the output quorum
is the rightmost one.
A correct but inefficient way to solve RC is as follows. Each party si sends its input to all parties
of the appropriate input quorum. Then the computation is performed from left to right. All parties
in each quorum compute the appropriate gate operation on their inputs, and send their outputs to all
parties in the right neighboring quorums via all-to-all communication. At the next level, all parties
in each quorum take the majority of the received messages in order to determine the correct input
for their gate. At the end, the parties in the rightmost quorum will compute the correct output of the
circuit. They then forward this output back from right to left through the quorum graph using the
same all-to-all communication and majority filtering.
Unfortunately, this naive algorithm requires O(m log2 n) messages and O(m log n) computa-
tional operations. Our main goal is to remove the logarithmic factors. 4
Leaders and the CHECK Algorithm: A more efficient approach is for each quorum to have a
leader, and for this leader to receive inputs, perform gate computations, and send off the output.
Unfortunately, a single bad leader can corrupt the entire computation.
To address this issue, we create CHECK (Section 2.3). This algorithm determines if there has
been a corruption, and if so, returns at least one pair of parties that are in conflict. Informally, we
say that a pair of parties are in conflict if they each accuse the other of malicious behavior. In such a
situation, we know that at least one party in the pair is bad. Our approach is to mark both parties in
each conflicting pair, and then to forbid any marked party from being a leader of a quorum. 5
The basic idea of CHECK is to have multiple rounds where in each round, a new party is selected
independently at random from each quorum. We call these parties the checkers. For convenience of
presentation, we will refer to the leaders as the checkers for round 0. For each round i ≥ 1, all i
checkers at gate g: 1) receive inputs to g from all i checkers at input gates for g; 2) compute the gate
4 We note that such asymptotic improvements can be significant for large networks. For example, if n =
64,000, then we would expect our algorithm to reduce message costs by a factor of log2 n = 255.
5 A technical point is that we may need to unmark all parties in a quorum if too many parties in that quorum
become marked. However, a potential function argument (Lemma 5) shows that it is still the case that after
O(t) markings, all bad parties will be marked.
4output for g based on these inputs; and 3) send this output to all i checkers at each output gate for
g. If a checker ever receives inconsistent inputs, it calls UPDATE (Section 2.4), which will return at
least one pair of parties that are in conflict. Unfortunately, waiting until a round where each gate has
had at least one good checker would require O(log n) rounds.
To do better, we use the following approach. Let G be the quorum graph as defined above and
let the checkers be selected as above. Call a subgraph of G bad in a given round if all checkers in
the nodes of that subgraph are bad in that round. Any corruption in the first round must occur in a
bad subgraph. Moreover, for i rounds of CHECK to fail to find a corruption, there must be nesting
levels of bad subgraphs in G in each of those i rounds.
When CHECK elects a good checker at a quorum, it is as if it is removing the node associated
with the quorum from the quorum graph. Thus, we can view CHECK as repeatedly removing nodes
from increasingly smaller subgraphs ofG until no nodes remain, at which the corruption is detected.
A key lemma (Lemma 1) shows that for any directed acyclic graph (DAG) with m nodes and max-
imum degree 4, when each node is deleted with probability 3/4, the probability that a connected
subgraph of size Ω(logm) survives is at most 1/2. Using this lemma, we can show that CHECK
requires only O(log∗m) rounds to detect a corruption with constant probability.6
Since CHECK requires O((m + n log n)(log∗m)2) messages, we can call it with probability
1/(log∗m)2 and obtain asymptotically optimal resource costs for the RC problem, while incurring
an expected O(t(log∗m)2) corruptions.
1.4 Related Work
Our results are inspired by recent work on self-healing algorithms. Early work of [8,12,17,24,25]
discusses different restoration mechanisms to preserve network performance by adding capacity and
rerouting traffic streams in the presence of node or link failures. This work presents mathematical
models to determine global optimal restoration paths, and provides methods for capacity optimiza-
tion of path-restorable networks.
More recent work [4,22,10,9,19,5] considers models where the following process repeats indef-
initely: an adversary deletes some nodes in the network, and the algorithm adds edges. The algo-
rithm is constrained to never increase the degree of any node by more than a logarithmic factor from
its original degree. In this model, researchers have presented algorithms that ensure the following
properties: the network stays connected and the diameter does not increase by much [4,22,10]; the
shortest path between any pair of nodes does not increase by much [9]; expansion properties of the
network are approximately preserved [19]; and keeping network backbones densely connected [5].
This paper particularly builds on [16]. That paper describes self-healing algorithms that provide
reliable communication, with a minimum of corruptions, even when a Byzantine adversary can
take over a constant fraction of the nodes in a network. While our attack model is similar to [16],
reliable computation is more challenging than reliable communication, and hence this paper requires
a significantly different technical approach. Additionally, we improve the fraction of bad parties that
can be tolerated from 1/8 to 1/4.
Reliable multiparty computation (RC) is closely related to the problem of secure multiparty
computation (MPC) which has been studied extensively for several decades (see e.g. [26,2,3,21]
or the recent book [20]). RC is simpler than MPC in that it does not require inputs of the parties
to remain private. Our algorithm for RC is significantly more efficient than current algorithms for
MPC, which require at least polylogarithmic blowup in communication and computational costs in
order to tolerate a Byzantine adversary. We reduce these costs through our self-healing approach,
which expends additional resources only when corruptions occur, and is able to “quarantine” bad
parties after O(t(log∗m)2) corruptions.
6 This probability can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by adjusting the hidden constant in theO(log∗m) rounds.
51.5 Organization of Paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our algorithms. The analysis
of our algorithms is shown in Section 3. Finally, we conclude and describe problems for future work
in Section 4.
2 Our Algorithms
In this section, we describe our algorithms: COMPUTE, COMPUTE-CIRCUIT, CHECK and UP-
DATE.
Our algorithms aim at detecting corruptions and marking the bad parties. Parties that are marked
are not allowed to participate in the computation process. Initially, all parties are unmarked.
Recall that there are n parties, each provides an input to an input quorum, Qi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
and then the computation is performed through m quorums Qj , for n+ 1 ≤ j ≤ m+ n. The result
is produced at an output quorum Qm+n.
Before discussing our main COMPUTE algorithm, we describe that when a party x broadcasts
a message msg, signed by a quorum Q, to a set of parties S, it calls BROADCAST (msg,Q, S).
2.1 BROADCAST
In BROADCAST (Algorithm 1), we use threshold cryptography to avoid the overhead of Byzantine
Agreement. In a (η, η′)-threshold cryptographic scheme, a private key is distributed among η parties
in such a way that 1) any subset of more than η′ parties can jointly reassemble the key; and 2) no
subset of at most η′ parties can recover the key. The private key can be distributed using a Distributed
Key Generation (DKG) protocol[13]. DKG generates the public/private key shares of all parties in
every quorum. The public key of each quorum is known to all parties in the quorum, and to all parties
in all neighboring quorums in the circuit.
Algorithm 1 BROADCAST(msg,Q, S) . A party x calls this procedure in order to send a
message msg, signed by quorum Q, to a set of parties S.
1: Party x sends message msg to all parties in Q.
2: Each party in Q signs msg by its private key share to obtain its message share.
3: Each party in Q sends its message share back to party x.
4: Party x interpolates at least 3|Q|
4
message shares to obtain a signed-message of Q.
5: Party x sends this signed-message to all parties in S.
In particular, we use a (|Q|, 3|Q|4 − 1)-threshold scheme, where |Q| is the quorum size. A party
x calls BROADCAST in order to send a message msg to all parties in S so that: 1) at least 3/4-
fraction of the parties in quorum Q have received the same message msg; 2) they agree upon the
content of msg; and 3) they give a permission to x to broadcast this message.
Any call to BROADCAST has O(log n + |S|) messages, O(log n) computational operations for
signing the message msg by O(log n) parties in Q and O(1) latency.
2.2 COMPUTE
Now we describe our main algorithm, COMPUTE (Algorithm 2), which calls COMPUTE-CIRCUIT
(Algorithm 3). In COMPUTE-CIRCUIT, the n parties broadcast their inputs to the input quorums.
The input quorums forward these inputs to a circuit ofm leaders in order to perform the computation
and provide the result to the output quorum. Then this result is sent through the same circuit of
leaders back to all parties. Recall that a leader of a quorum, is a party in this quorum, that is: 1)
6a representative of all parties in the quorum; and 2) it is known to all parties in the quorum and
neighboring quorums. We assume that all parties provide their inputs to the circuit in the same
round.
Algorithm 2 COMPUTE . performs a reliable computation and sends the result reliably to all
parties.
1: COMPUTE-CIRCUIT . computes and sends back the result through a circuit of leaders.
2: TRIGGER-CHECK . The output quorum triggers CHECK with probability 1/(log∗m)2.
In the presence of an adversary, COMPUTE-CIRCUIT is vulnerable to corruptions. Thus, COM-
PUTE calls TRIGGER-CHECK (Algorithm 4), in which the parties of the output quorum decide
together, to trigger CHECK (Algorithm 5) with probability 1/(log∗m)2, using secure multiparty
computation (MPC) [21]. CHECK is triggered in order to detect if a computation was corrupted in
the last call to COMPUTE-CIRCUIT, with probability at least 1/2.
Algorithm 3 COMPUTE-CIRCUIT . performs a computation through a circuit of leaders
producing a result at the output quorum; and it sends back result through same circuit to all parties.
1: for i = 1, . . . , n do . provides the inputs to the circuit
2: Party si broadcasts its input ai to all parties in quorum Qi.
3: All parties in Qi send ai to the leaders of the right neighboring quorums of Qi.
4: end for
5: for i = n+ 1, . . . ,m+ n− 1 do . performs the computation.
6: for all j : i < j ≤ m+ n and (Qi, Qj) ∈ Circuit do
7: if leader qi ∈ Qi receives all its inputs then
8: qi performs an operation on its inputs producing an output, bi.
9: qi sends bi to leader qj ∈ Qj .
10: end if
11: end for
12: end for
13: if leader qm+n ∈ Qm+n receives all its inputs then . produces and broadcasts result to output quorum.
14: qm+n performs an operation on its inputs producing an output, bm+n.
15: qm+n broadcasts bm+n to all parties in Qm+n.
16: end if
17: for i = m+ n, . . . , n+ 2 do . sends back the result to the leftmost leaders.
18: for all j : n+ 1 ≤ j < i and (Qj , Qi) ∈ Circuit do
19: Leader qi ∈ Qi sends bm+n to leader qj ∈ Qj .
20: end for
21: end for
22: for i = 1, . . . , n do . sends result to all parties after broadcasting it to the input quorums.
23: The leaders of the right neighboring quorums of Qi broadcast bm+n to all parties in Qi.
24: All parties in Qi send bm+n to sender si.
25: end for
Unfortunately, while CHECK can determine if a corruption occurred, it does not specify the loca-
tion where the corruption occurred. Thus, if CHECK detects a corruption, UPDATE (Algorithm 10)
is called. When UPDATE is called, it identifies two neighboring quorums Q and Q′ in the circuit,
7Algorithm 4 TRIGGER-CHECK . The parties of the output quorum Qm+n trigger CHECK with
probability 1/(log∗m)2.
1: Each party in Qm+n chooses an input: a real number uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.
2: The parties of Qm+n perform MPC to find the output, prob, which is the sum of all their inputs divided by
|Qm+n|.
3: if prob ≤ 1/(log∗m)2 then
4: CHECK
5: end if
such that at least one pair of parties in these quorums is in conflict and at least one party in this pair
is bad. Then quorums Q and Q′ mark these parties and notify all other quorums that these parties
are in. All quorums in which these parties are notify their neighboring quorums. For each pair of
leaders that is in conflict, their quorums elect a new pair of unmarked leaders uniformly at random.
If (1/2 − γ)-fraction of parties in any quorum have been marked, for any constant γ > 0, e.g.,
γ = 0.01, they are set unmarked in all their quorums and neighboring quorums.
Moreover, we use BROADCAST in COMPUTE-CIRCUIT and CHECK in order to handle any
accusation issued in UPDATE against the parties that provide the inputs to the input quorums, or
those that receive the result in the output quorum.
Our model does not directly consider concurrency. In a real system, concurrent executions of
COMPUTE that overlap at a single quorum may allow the adversary to achieve multiple corruptions
at the cost of a single marked bad party. However, this does not effect correctness, and, in practice,
this issue can be avoided by serializing concurrent executions of COMPUTE. For simplicity of
presentation, we leave the concurrency aspect out of this paper.
2.3 CHECK
In this section, we describe CHECK algorithm, which is stated formally as Algorithm 5. In this
algorithm, we make use of subquorums, where a subquorum is a subset of unmarked parties in a
quorum. Let Uk be the set of all unmarked parties in quorum Qk, for 1 ≤ k ≤ m+ n.
Algorithm 5 CHECK . Party r calls CHECK to check for corruptions.
1: Let subquorums, S1j , S
2
j and S
3
j , be initially empty, for all n+ 1 ≤ j ≤ m+ n.
2: for i← 1, . . . , 16 log∗m do
3: ELECT(Qm+n) . elects a party r ∈ Qm+n.
4: Party r constructs R1, R2 and R3 to be three m by m′ arrays of random numbers, where m′ is the
maximum size of any quorum. Note that R1[k, k′], R2[k, k′] and R3[k, k′] are three uniformly random
numbers between 1 and k′, for 1 ≤ k ≤ m and 1 ≤ k′ ≤ m′.
5: REQUEST(R1, R2, i) . r requests all senders to recompute.
6: RECOMPUTE(R2, i, r) . recomputes producing the result, bm+n, at r.
7: RESEND-RESULT(R3, bm+n, i) . r sends back bm+n to all parties.
8: end for
Note that: for each algorithm that is called in CHECK, if any party has previously received a message, it
verifies this message with all subsequent messages; also if a party receives inconsistent messages or fails to
receive an expected message, then it initiates a call to UPDATE.
CHECK runs for O(log∗m) rounds. For each round i, the parties of the output quorum Qm+n
elect an unmarked party r from Qm+n to be in charge of the recomputation in round i. This election
8Algorithm 6 ELECT(Q) . Parties in Q elect an unmarked party in Q using MPC.
1: Let each party in the set of unmarked parties, U ⊂ Q, is assigned a unique integer from 1 to |U |.
2: Each party in Q chooses an input: an integer uniformly distributed between 1 and |U |.
3: The parties of Q perform MPC to find the output: the sum of all their inputs modulo |U |.
4: The party in U associated with this output number is the elected party.
process is stated formally in ELECT (Algorithm 6). The elected party r calls REQUEST (Algorithm
7) to send a request through a DAG of subquorums, S1j ’s, to the n senders to recompute. Then
the recomputation starts by RECOMPUTE (Algorithm 8), in which each sender that receives such
request provides its input to redo the computation through a DAG of subquorums, S2j ’s. Finally,
when r receives the result of the computation, it calls RESEND-RESULT (Algorithm 9) in order to
send back this result to the senders through a DAG of subquorums S3j ’s, for n+ 1 ≤ j ≤ m+ n.
Algorithm 7 REQUEST(R1, R2, i) . r requests n senders through a DAG of subquoums, S1j ’s,
for n+ 1 ≤ j ≤ m+ n, to redo the computation.
1: r sets REQ to be a message consisting of R1, R2, i and r.
2: r broadcasts REQ to all parties of quorum Qm+n.
3: All parties in Qm+n calculate party, qm+n ∈ Um+n, of index R1[m, |Um+n|] to be added to S1m+n.
4: The parties in Qm+n send REQ to the parties of S1m+n.
5: for j ← m+ n, . . . , n+ 2 do . forwards REQ from output quorum to input quorums.
6: for all k : n+ 1 ≤ k < j and (Qk, Qj) ∈ Circuit do
7: All i parties in S1j calculate party, qk ∈ Uk, of index R1[k − n, |Uk|] to be added to S1k .
8: The parties in S1j forward REQ and the IDs of all parties in S
1
k to party qk.
9: Party qk sends REQ to all the parties in S1k .
10: end for
11: end for
12: for k ← n, . . . , 1 do . Input quorums forward REQ to all senders.
13: All i parties in the right neighboring subquorums of Qk broadcast REQ to all parties in Qk.
14: All parties in Qk send REQ to sender sk.
15: end for
Moreover, in ELECT (Q), the parties of quorum Q use MPC to elect an unmarked party uni-
formly at random from Q. Note that at any moment at least half of the unmarked parties in Q are
good, thus the elected party is good with probability at least 1/2. Finally, this election protocol runs
in O(1) time, and requires O(log2 n) messages and O(log n) computational operations.
During CHECK, if any party receives inconsistent messages or fails to receive and verify any
expected message in any round, it initiates a call to UPDATE.
2.4 UPDATE
When a computation is corrupted and CHECK detects this corruption, UPDATE is called. The UP-
DATE algorithm is described formally as Algorithm 10. When UPDATE starts, all parties in each
quorum in the circuit are notified.
The main purpose of UPDATE is to 1) determine the location in which the corruption occurred;
and 2) mark the parties that are in conflict.
To determine the location in which the corruption occurred, UPDATE calls INVESTIGATE
(Algorithm 11) to investigate the current situation by letting each party involved in COMPUTE-
9Algorithm 8 RECOMPUTE(R, i, r) . The n senders provide inputs to a DAG of subquorums,
S2j ’s, for n+ 1 ≤ j ≤ m+ n, in order to recompute producing a result, bm+n, at r.
1: for each sender sj that receives REQ; 1 ≤ j ≤ n and n+ 1 ≤ k, k′ ≤ m+ n do . provides the inputs.
2: sj broadcasts its input aj , i and R to all parties in Qj .
3: All parties in Qj calculate at most two right neighboring parties, qk ∈ Uk and qk′ ∈ Uk′ , of indices
R[k − n, |Uk|] and R[k′ − n, |Uk′ |] to be added to the right neighboring subquorums, S2k and S2k′ .
4: All parties in Qj send aj , i and R to the parties in S2k and the parties in S
2
k′ .
5: end for
6: for j ← n+ 1, . . . ,m+ n− 1 do . recomputes
7: for all k : j < k ≤ m+ n and (Qj , Qk) ∈ Circuit do
8: if the new added party, qj ∈ S2j , receives all its inputs then
9: qj performs an operation on its inputs producing an output bj .
10: qj sends bj , i and R to the parties of S2j .
11: All i parties in S2j calculate party, qk ∈ Uk, of index R[k − n, |Uk|] to be added to S2k .
12: The parties in S2j send bj , i, R and the IDs of all parties in S
2
k to party qk.
13: end if
14: end for
15: end for
16: All i parties in Sm+n broadcast bm+n, i and R to all parties in Qm+n.
17: All parties in Qm+n send bm+n, i and R to party r. . r receives the result.
Algorithm 9 RESEND-RESULT(R, bm+n, i) . Party r sends back the result of the computation,
bm+n, through a DAG of subquorums, S3j ’s, to n senders, for n+ 1 ≤ j ≤ m+ n.
1: r sets RESULT to be a message consisting of R, bm+n, i and r.
2: r broadcasts RESULT to all parties of quorum Qm+n.
3: All parties in Qm+n calculate party, qm+n ∈ Um+n, of index R[m, |Um+n|] to be added to S3m+n.
4: The parties in Qm+n send RESULT to the parties of S3m+n.
5: for j ← m+ n, . . . , n+ 2 do . forwards result from output quorum to input quorums.
6: for all k : n+ 1 ≤ k < j and (Qk, Qj) ∈ Circuit do
7: All i parties in S3j calculate party, qk ∈ Uk, of index R[k − n, |Uk|] to be added to S3k .
8: The parties in S3j forward RESULT and the IDs of all parties in S
3
k to party qk.
9: Party qk sends RESULT to all the parties in S3k .
10: end for
11: end for
12: for k ← n, . . . , 1 do . Input quorums forward the result to all senders.
13: All i parties in the right neighboring subquorums of Qk broadcast RESULT to all parties in Qk.
14: All parties in Qk send RESULT to party sk.
15: end for
Algorithm 10 UPDATE . Party q′ ∈ Q′ calls UPDATE after it claims that it detects a corruption.
1: q′ broadcasts the fact that it calls UPDATE along with the messages it has received in this call to COMPUTE
to all parties in Q′.
2: The parties in Q′ verify that q′ received inconsistent messages before proceeding.
3: Q′ notifies all quorums in the circuit via all-to-all communication that UPDATE is called.
4: INVESTIGATE . investigates all participants to determine corruption locations.
5: MARK-IN-CONFLICTS . marks the parties that are in conflict.
10
Algorithm 11 INVESTIGATE . investigates parties to determine corruption locations.
1: for each party, q, involved in the last call to COMPUTE-CIRCUIT or CHECK do
2: q compiles all messages they have received (and from whom) and they have sent (and to whom) in the
last call to COMPUTE-CIRCUIT or CHECK.
3: q broadcasts these messages to all parties in its quorum and neighboring quorums.
4: end for
CIRCUIT or CHECK broadcast all messages they have received or sent. Then, UPDATE calls
MARK-IN-CONFLICTS (Algorithm 12) in order to mark the parties that are in conflict, where a
pair of parties is in conflict if at least one of these parties broadcasted messages that conflict with the
messages broadcasted by the other party in this pair. Note that each pair of parties that is in conflict
has at least one bad party. Recall that if (1/2− γ)-fraction of parties in any quorum are marked, for
any constant γ > 0, e.g., γ = 0.01, they are set unmarked. Also, for each pair of leaders that get
marked, their quorums elect another pair of unmarked leaders.
Algorithm 12 MARK-IN-CONFLICTS . marks the parties that are in conflict.
1: for each pair of parties, (qx, qy), that is in conflict*, in quorums (Qx, Qy) do
2: party qy broadcasts a conflict message, {qx, qy}, to all parties in Qy .
3: each party in Qy forwards {qx, qy} to all parties in Qx.
4: all parties in Qx (or Qy) send {qx, qy} to the other quorums that has qx (or qy).
5: each quorum has qx or qy sends {qx, qy} to its neighboring quorums.
6: end for
7: for each party q that receives conflict message {qx, qy} do
8: q marks qx and qy in its marking table.
9: end for
10: if (1/2− γ)-fraction of parties in any quorum have been marked, for γ = 0.01 then
11: each of these parties is set unmarked in all its quorums.
12: each of these parties is set unmarked in all its neighboring quorums.
13: end if
14: for each pair of leaders, (qx, qy), that is in conflict, in quorums (Qx, Qy) do
15: ELECT(Qx) and ELECT(Qy) to elect a pair of unmarked leaders, (q′x, q′y).
16: Qx and Qy notify their neighboring quorums with (q′x, q′y).
17: end for
* A pair of parties, (qx, qy), is in conflict if: 1) qx was scheduled to send an output to qy at some point in
the last call to COMPUTE-CIRCUIT or CHECK; and 2) qy does not receive an expected message from qx in
INVESTIGATE, or qy receives a message in INVESTIGATE that is different than the message that it has received
from qx in the last call to COMPUTE-CIRCUIT or CHECK.
3 Analysis
In this section, we prove Theorem 1. All logarithms are base 2.
Definition 1. Rooted Directed Acyclic Graph (R-DAG) is a DAG in which, for a vertex u called the
root and any other node v, there is at least one directed path from v to u.
Lemma 1. Given any R-DAG, of size n, in which each node has indegree of at most d and survives
independently with probability at most p such that 0 < p ≤ 1d − , for any constant  > 0, then
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the probability of having a subgraph, rooted at some node, having only surviving nodes, of size
Ω( logn(1−pd)2 ) is at most 1/2.
Proof. This proof makes use of the following three propositions, but first we define some notations.
Given an R-DAG, D(V,E), with size n and maximum indegree d, after each node survives
independently with probability at most p such that 0 < p ≤ 1d − , for any constant  > 0, we
explore D to find a subgraph with only surviving nodes of size more than k, rooted at an arbitrary
node v (assuming that node v survives).
Let D′(v) be the maximum subgraph of surviving nodes, rooted at node v. Let each node in D
have a status, which is either inactive, active or neutral. During the exploration process, the status
of nodes is changed. A node x is inactive if x ∈ D′(v) and its children are explored determining
which one is in D′(v). A node x is active if x ∈ D′(v) but its children are not explored yet. A node
x is neutral if it is neither active nor inactive, i.e., node x and its children are not explored yet.
The exploration process runs in at most k > 0 steps. Initially, we set an arbitrary surviving node,
v, active and all other nodes neutral. At each step i, we choose an active node, wi, in an arbitrary
way, and we explore all its children. For all (wi, w′i) ∈ E and w′i survives and is neutral, we set w′i
active, otherwise w′i remains as it is. Then, we set wi inactive. Note that at any step, if there is no
active node, the exploration process terminates. Now let di be the maximum number of children of
node wi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, i.e.,
di =
{
deg(wi)− 1 if wi ∈ V − root(D),
deg(wi) otherwise.
where deg(wi) is the degree of node wi and root(D) is the root node of D. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
let Xi be a non-negative random variable for the number of surviving neutral children of wi, and
let Yi be a non-negative random variable for the number of surviving non-neutral children of wi.
Note that Y1 = 0. So Xi follows a binomial distribution with parameters (di − Yi) and p, i.e.,
Xi ∼ Bin(di − Yi, p). Let Ai be a non-negative random variable for the total number of active
nodes after i steps, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Proposition 1. Ai =
{∑k
i=1Xi − (k − 1) if Ai−1 > 0,
0 otherwise.
Proof. Since the process starts initially with one active node v, A0 = 1. Now we have two cases of
Ai−1 to compute Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ k:
Case 1 (process terminates before i steps): If Ai−1 = 0, then Aj = 0 for i ≤ j ≤ k.
Case 2 (otherwise): If Ai−1 > 0, then Ai = Ai−1 + Xi − 1, where after exploring wi, the total
number of active nodes is the number of new active nodes (Xi) due to the exploration of wi in
addition to the total number of active nodes of previous steps (Ai−1) excluding wi that becomes
inactive at the end of step i. uunionsq
Now let |D′(v)| be the number of nodes in D′(v).
Proposition 2. Pr(|D′(v)| > k) ≤ Pr(∑ki=1Xi ≥ k).
Proof. To prove this proposition, we first prove that Pr(|D′(v)| > k) ≤ Pr(Ak > 0). In order to
do that, we prove that |D′(v)| > k =⇒ Ak > 0. If |D′(v)| > k, then the exploration process does
not terminate before k steps. This implies that after k steps, there are k inactive nodes and at least one
active node remains. This follows that Ak > 0. Thus, we have Pr(|D′(v)| > k) ≤ Pr(Ak > 0).
Now we prove that Pr(Ak > 0) ≤ Pr(
∑k
i=1Xi − (k − 1) > 0). To do that, we prove
that Ak > 0 =⇒
∑k
i=1Xi − (k − 1) > 0. If Ak > 0, then Aj > 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
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By Proposition 1, we obtain that
∑j
i=1Xi − (j − 1) > 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k. This follows that
Pr(Ak > 0) ≤ Pr(
∑k
i=1Xi − (k − 1) > 0).
Now, we obtain Pr(|D′(v)| > k) ≤ Pr(∑ki=1Xi−(k−1) > 0), or equivalently, Pr(|D′(v)| >
k) ≤ Pr(∑ki=1Xi > k−1). Since k is a positive integer, we havePr(|D′(v)| > k) ≤ Pr(∑ki=1Xi ≥
k). uunionsq
Proposition 3. Pr(
∑k
i=1Xi ≥ k) ≤ e−
(1−pd)2k
1+pd .
Proof. To prove this proposition, we first make use of stochastic dominance. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, let
X+i ∼ Bin(d, p), and let X+1 , ..., X+k be independent random variables. We know that Yi ≥ 0
and di ≤ d for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By Theorem (1.1) part (a) of [15], for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, X+i first-
order stochastically dominates Xi, i.e., X+i is stochastically larger than Xi. Hence,
∑k
i=1X
+
i is
stochastically larger than
∑k
i=1Xi. Thus, we have Pr(
∑k
i=1Xi ≥ k) ≤ Pr(
∑k
i=1X
+
i ≥ k).
Now let Sk =
∑k
i=1X
+
i . By Chernoff bounds, for δ > 0, we obtain
Pr(Sk ≥ (1 + δ)E(Sk)) ≤
(
eδ
(1 + δ)(1+δ)
)E(Sk)
≤ e− δ
2
2+δE(Sk).
We know that Sk ∼ Bin(kd, p). Thus, E(Sk) = pdk. Therefore, we have
Pr(Sk ≥ (1 + δ)pdk) ≤ e− δ
2
2+δ pdk.
For δ = 1−pdpd , we obtain Pr(Sk ≥ k) ≤ e−
(1−pd)2k
1+pd . uunionsq
Now by Propositions 2 and 3, we have Pr(|D′(v)| > k) ≤ e− (1−pd)
2k
1+pd . We know that node v
survives with probability at most p. Thus, we obtain
Pr(|D′(v)| > k) ≤ pe− (1−pd)
2k
1+pd .
Union bound over n nodes, then the probability that there exists a subgraph of D, rooted at one
node, having only surviving nodes of size more than k is at most
nPr(|D′(v)| > k) ≤ npe− (1−pd)
2k
1+pd .
Note that npe−
(1−pd)2k
1+pd ≤ 1/2, when k ≥ 1+pd(1−pd)2 log e log(2pn). Thus, the probability of having
such a subgraph of size more than 1+pd(1−pd)2 log e log(2pn), or equivalently, Ω
(
logn
(1−pd)2
)
, is at most
1/2. uunionsq
Corollary 1. For any R-DAG, of size n, the probability of having a subgraph, rooted at one node,
having only surviving nodes, of size at least n/2 is o(1).
Recall that in each round of CHECK, the new added parties are chosen uniformly at random.
We define a deception DAG, Di, as a subgraph of the DAG containing the new added parties, that
has the following properties: 1) it has only bad parties, of which the adversary makes use to corrupt
the computation; 2) it receives all its inputs, and each input is provided correct by at least one good
party; and 3) each output it produces is provided to at least one good party, and at least one output
is dropped or corrupted.
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When the adversary corrupts at least one output of a deception DAG in any round, it has to keep
doing such corruption in all subsequent deception DAGs; otherwise, the good parties that expect to
receive certain messages from the deception DAG will receive inconsistent messages and so they
call UPDATE. Even if the adversary keeps corrupting these outputs from a round to another, the
corruption will be detected if the deception DAG shrinks to size zero at any round.
In the following facts, we show that 1) any deception DAG never expands in any direction from
a round to another; and 2) it shrinks logarithmically from a round to another with probability at
least 1/2. This will imply that any deception DAG shrinks to size zero in O(log∗m) rounds with
probability at least 1/2.
Fact 2 The deception DAG in any round is a supergraph of all subsequent deception DAGs.
Let p be the probability of selecting an unmarked bad party uniformly at random in any quorum.
Recall that the fraction of bad parties in any quorum is at most 1/4, and at any time the fraction of
unmarked parties in any quorum is at least 1/2 + γ, for any constant γ > 0. Thus, the fraction of
unmarked bad parties in any quorum is 1/21+2γ , i.e., p ≤ 1/21+2γ .
Fact 3 With probability at least 1/2, any deception DAG, of size m, that is rooted at one party,
shrinks to size zero in O(log∗m) rounds, where 0 < p ≤ 1/21+2γ , for any constant γ > 0.
Proof. Given a deception DAG, of size m, that is rooted at one party. By Fact 2, the deception DAG
never expands over rounds. LetXi be an indicator random variable, which is 1 if the deception DAG
shrinks logarithmically from a round i to round i+ 1; and 0 otherwise. Note that in each round, the
receiver that is elected by the output quorum is good with probability at least 1/2. By Lemma 1,
the probability that the deception DAG shrinks logarithmically is at least 1/2 given that the elected
receiver is good. Since the probability of electing a good receiver is independent of the probability
that the deception DAG shrinks logarithmically, Xi = 1 with probability at least 1/4.
Now we show the required number of the Xi random variables to be 1 in order to shrink the
deception DAG of sizem to 0. Now fix p. Due to the constant factor, c ≤ 3(1−pd)2 , of the logarithmic
shrinking in Lemma 2, then after having (log∗m− 2) of Xi’s equal 1, the deception DAG of size m
will shrink to size 2c(log 2c). Moreover, Lemma 2 will not be applicable after the deception DAG
shrinks to a constant size, k ≤ c log k. For such case, we simply make use of Corollary 1.
Thus, after having (log∗m − 2) of Xi’s equal 1, by Corollary 1, we further require at most
log(2c(log 2c), of Xi’s equal 1 to eventually shrink the deception DAG to size 0. This implies that
we require at most 2 log∗m of the Xi random variables to be 1.
Let X =
∑16 log∗m
i=1 Xi. Then E(X) = 4 log
∗m, and since the Xi’s are independent, by Cher-
noff bounds,
Pr (X < (1− δ)4 log∗m) ≤
(
eδ
(1 + δ)1+δ
)4 log∗m
.
For δ = 12 and m > 2, Pr (X < 2 log
∗m) ≤
(
e
1
2
( 32 )
3
2
)4 log∗m
< 12 . uunionsq
Lemma 2. With probability at least 1/2, any deception DAG, of size m, shrinks to size zero in
O(log∗m) rounds, where 0 < p ≤ 1/21+2γ , for any constant γ > 0.
Proof. Let D be a deception DAG with multiple outputs and the adversary corrupts more than one
output. Now letDm be the maximum subgraph ofD, that is rooted at one party of a corrupted output.
Note that by definition any maximal subgraph that is rooted at one party of a corrupted output is a
deception DAG. By Fact 2, each of these deception DAGs never expands over rounds. By Fact 3,
each of these deception DAGs shrinks to size zero in a number of rounds at most the number of
rounds that Dm shrinks to size zero.
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Now we consider the case where the adversary maintains more than one deception DAG in the
same round. By Fact 2 and the definition of deception DAG, the deception DAGs of the same round
do not overlap, and they shrink independently. Also, by Fact 3, any maximum deception DAG, of
one root, shrinks to size zero in a number of rounds that is at least the number of rounds that any
other deception DAG, of one root, shrinks to size zero.
Therefore, for the adversary to maximize the expected number of rounds in CHECK is to con-
sider the maximum deception DAG, of one root, in the first round of CHECK. We know that this
maximum deception DAG has size at most m. By Fact 3, it shrinks to size zero in O(log∗m). uunionsq
The next lemma shows that CHECK catches corruptions with probability ≥ 1/2.
Lemma 3. Assume some party selected uniformly at random in the last call to COMPUTE-CIRCUIT
has corrupted a computation. Then when the algorithm CHECK is called, with probability at least
1/2, some party will call UPDATE.
Lemma 4. If some party selected uniformly at random in the last call to COMPUTE-CIRCUIT or
CHECK has corrupted a computation, then UPDATE will identify a pair of neighboring quorums Q
and Q′ such that at least one pair of parties in these quorums is in conflict and at least one party in
such pair is bad.
The next lemma bounds the number of calls to UPDATE before all bad parties are marked.
Lemma 5. UPDATE is called O(t) times before all bad parties are marked.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented algorithms for reliable multiparty computations. These algorithms can signifi-
cantly reduce message cost and number of computational operations to be asymptotically optimal.
The price we pay for this improvement is the possibility of computation corruption. In particular,
if there are t ≤ ( 14 − )n bad parties, for any constant  > 0, our algorithm allows O(t(log∗m)2)
computations to be corrupted in expectation.
Many problems remain. First, it seems unlikely that the smallest number of corruptions allow-
able by an attack-resistant algorithm with optimal message complexity is O(t(log∗m)2). Can we
improve this to O(t) or else prove a non-trivial lower bound? Second, we allow the inputs of parties
to reveal. Can we maintain the privacy of these inputs? Third, we assume a partially synchronous
communication model, which is crucial for our CHECK algorithm to detect computation corruptions
over rounds. Can we extend this algorithm to fit for asynchronous computations?
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A Appendix - Deferred Proofs
Fact 2. The deception DAG in any round is a supergraph of all subsequent deception DAGs.
Proof. We know by definition that the deception DAG is bordered by the good parties that provide
the inputs to the DAG, and the good parties that receive the outputs from the DAG.
In each round, all parties of each subquorum in round i send their outputs to the new added
party in the next subquorum. Thus, the good parties that provide the correct inputs to the deception
DAG of round i, will provide the correct inputs to the deception DAGs in all subsequent rounds.
Moreover, in each round, the new added party in each subquorum forwards its output to all parties in
its subquorum. Note that each good party has previously received a message, it verifies this message
with all subsequent messages it receives, and if it receives inconsistent messages or fails to receive
an expected message, then it calls UPDATE.
Therefore, all good parties that border a deception DAG in any round will border all subsequent
deception DAGs. uunionsq
Lemma 3. Assume some party selected uniformly at random in the last call to COMPUTE-CIRCUIT
has corrupted a computation. Then when CHECK is called, with probability at least 1/2, some party
will call UPDATE.
Proof. Recall that in REQUEST, in each round for O(log∗m) rounds, a new party r is elected by
the output quorum to send a request to the senders in order to recompute. By Lemma 2, this request
is sent reliably with probability at least 1/2 to all input quorums. Note that each request has a round
number. Thus, at any round, if any good party in any input quorum receives a request of round
number i and has not received (i− 1) requests of proper round numbers, then it calls UPDATE.
If all input quorums receive all requests properly in all O(log∗m) rounds, then RECOMPUTE
must be called properly O(log∗m) times by all input quorums. By Lemma 2, the result is computed
and sent reliably to the output quorum with probability at least 1/2.
Recall that in RECOMPUTE, the round number i is forwarded with the computation results from
the senders to the output quorum. Thus, at any round, if any good party in the output quorum receives
a result with a round number i and has not received (i−1) results with proper rounds numbers, then
it calls UPDATE.
Now, if all parties in the output quorum receive all results properly in all O(log∗m) rounds,
then RESEND-RESULT must be called O(log∗m) times by the output quorum. By Lemma 2, the
result of the computation is sent back reliably to all senders with probability at least 1/2. Thus, the
probability that CHECK succeeds in finding a corruption and calling UPDATE is at least 1/2. uunionsq
Lemma 4. If some party selected uniformly at random in the last call to COMPUTE-CIRCUIT or
CHECK has corrupted a computation, then UPDATE will identify a pair of neighboring quorums Q
and Q′ such that at least one pair of parties in these quorums is in conflict and at least one party in
such pair is bad.
Proof. First, we show that if a pair of parties x and y is in conflict, then at least one of them is bad.
Assume not. Then both x and y are good. This implies that party x would have truthfully reported
what it received and sent; any result that x has computed would have been sent directly to y; and y
would have truthfully reported what it received from x. But this is a contradiction, since for x and
y to be in conflict, y must have reported that it received from x something different than what x
reported sending.
Now consider the case where a selected unmarked bad leader corrupted the computation in the
last call to COMPUTE-CIRCUIT. By Lemma 3, with probability at least 1/2, some party, q′ ∈ Q′,
will call UPDATE. Recall that in UPDATE q′ broadcasts all messages it has received to all parties in
Q′. These parties verify if q′ received inconsistent messages before proceeding.
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In UPDATE, we know that each party, q ∈ Q, participated in the last call to COMPUTE broad-
casts what it has received and sent to all parties in Q. Thus, all parties of Q verify the correctness
of q’s computation. Thus, if the corruption occurs due to an incorrect computation made by a bad
party, this corruption will be detected and all parties will know that this party is bad.
Now if all parties compute correctly and CHECK detects a corruption, then we show that there
is some pair of parties will be in conflict. Assume this is not the case. Thus, by the definition of
corruption, there must be a deception DAG, in which all inputs are provided correct and an output
is corrupted at party q′. Then each pair of parties, (qj , qk) ∈ (Qj , Qk), in the deception DAG that
is rooted at q′, is not in conflict, for n + 1 ≤ j < k ≤ m + n. Thus, we have that 1) this DAG
received all its inputs correct; 2) all parties compute correctly; and 3) no pair of parties is in conflict.
This implies that it must be the case that q′ received the correct output. But if this is the case, then q′
that initially called UPDATE would have received no inconsistent messages. This is a contradiction
since in such a case, this party would have been unsuccessful in trying to initiate a call to UPDATE.
Thus, UPDATE will find two parties that are in conflict, and at least one of them will be bad. uunionsq
Lemma 5. UPDATE is called O(t) times before all bad parties are marked.
Proof. By Lemma 4, if a corruption occurred in the last call to COMPUTE-CIRCUIT, and it is
caught by CHECK, then UPDATE is called. UPDATE identifies at least one pair of parties that is in
conflict, and each of such pairs has at least one bad party.
Now let g be the number of marked good parties, and let b be the number of marked bad parties.
Also let f(b, g) = b− ( p1−p )g. Since 0 < p ≤ 1/21+2γ , for any constant γ > 0, 0 < p1−p ≤ 11+4γ .
For each corruption caught, at least one bad party is marked, and so f(b, g) increases by at least
1−2p
1−p since b increases by at least 1 and g increases by at most 1. When (1/2−γ)-fraction of parties
in any quorum Q get unmarked, for any constant γ > 0, f(b, g) further increases by at least 0 since
b decreases by at most p|Q|(1/2−γ) and g decreases by at least (1−p)|Q|(1/2−γ). Hence, f(b, g)
is monotonically increasing by at least 1−2p1−p for each corruption caught. When all bad parties are
marked, f(b, g) ≤ t. Therefore, after at most ( 1−p1−2p )t, or at most (1 + 12γ )t, calls to UPDATE, all
bad parties are marked. uunionsq
Proof of Theorem 1. We first show the message cost, the number of operations and the latency of
our algorithms. By Lemma 5, the number of calling UPDATE is at most O(t). Thus, the resource
cost of all calls to UPDATE is bounded as the number of calls to COMPUTE grows large. Therefore,
for the amortized cost, we consider only the cost of the calls to COMPUTE-CIRCUIT and CHECK.
When a computation is performed through a circuit ofm gates with a circuit depth `, COMPUTE-
CIRCUIT has message costO(m+n log n), number of operationsO(m+n log n) and latencyO(`).
CHECK has message costO((m+n log n)(log∗m)2), number of operationsO((m+n log n) log∗m)
and latency O(` log∗m), but CHECK is called only with probability 1/(log∗m)2. Hence, the call
to CHECK has an amortized expected message cost O(m + n log n), amortized computational op-
erations O(m+n lognlog∗m ) and an amortized expected latency O(`/ log
∗m).
In particular, if we call COMPUTE L times, then the expected total number of messages sent
will be O(L(m + n log n) + t(m log2 n)) with expected total number of computational operations
O(L(m+n log n)+t(m log n log∗m)) and latencyO(`(L+t)). This is true since UPDATE is called
O(t) times and each call to UPDATE has message cost O(m log2 n) with computational operations
O(m log n log∗m) and latency O(`).
Recall that by Lemma 5, the number of times CHECK must catch corruptions before all bad par-
ties are marked is O(t). In addition, if a bad party caused a corruption during a call to COMPUTE-
CIRCUIT, then by Lemmas 3 and 4, with probability at least 1/2, CHECK will catch it. As a conse-
quence, it will call UPDATE, which marks the parties that are in conflict. UPDATE is thus called
with probability 1/(log∗m)2, so the expected total number of corruptions is O(t(log∗m)2).
